Letter: My thoughs on Dr. Gilfoyle and nuclear weapons

Reading about the lecture given by Dr. Gilfoyle at UR, about nuclear weapons and the Conventional Test Ban Treaty, one particular statement stood out as particularly polemic in nature: "To be a good citizen and vote... you should care [about the CTBT]." As someone who may or may not be considered a good citizen, yet is unquestionably an active voter, let me offer my thoughts.

A simple look at the list of states that have not yet ratified the Conventional Test Ban Treaty reveals the futility of the exercise in today's world. States who either haven't signed or have signed, yet not ratified the CTBT, include Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, the United States, India, Pakistan, China, Iran, Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and Indonesia.

Additionally, there is evidence suggesting that the following states only *signed* the treaty with the expectation that A.) their respective governments would never ratify accession to the treaty, or B.) that the treaty would never achieve a quorum of signatories, and thus never go into force: much of the aforementioned list, as well as Turkey and Brazil.

In short, the Conventional Test Ban Treaty will never work as long as the foundational treaty on nuclear proliferation, the 1972 Non-proliferation Treaty, lacks a minimally-effective enforcement mechanism, and remains widely flouted by prominent states.

The international community must examine why the NPT has not worked in the first place, and work towards addressing the security concerns of the states currently not participating. From there, the U.N. can gather 100% global participation for the NPT, and achieve its goals: preventing nascent nuclear powers, reducing current stockpiles, and the safe use of peaceful nuclear technology.

If the security concerns leading to abstention from the NPT, and the non-proliferation community in general, are left unaddressed, then in the areas that truly face nuclear proliferation crises, such as the Middle East, East Asia, and increasingly, Latin America, the CTBT, and the underlying NPT framework, remain simply a large stack of papers.

And if one happens to recognize, as the author of this short commentary may, the near-impossibility of achieving 100% international agreement on what a safe, moral, and sustainable international security order would resemble, then the entire thing becomes a meaningless act of self-celebration and meaningless multi-lingual signature ceremonies.